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Blind Justice: Virginia’s Jury
Sentencing Scheme and
Impermissible Burdens on a
Defendant’s Right to a Jury Trial†
Mitchell E. McCloy
Abstract
This Note argues that Virginia’s mandatory jury sentencing
scheme, which bars juries from reviewing state sentencing
guidelines, impermissibly burdens a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. By analyzing both judge and
jury sentencing guidelines compliance rates from the past
twenty-five years, this Note demonstrates that in Virginia, a
defendant has a significantly higher chance of receiving a
harsher sentence after a jury trial than after a bench trial or a
guilty plea. Given that judges rarely modify jury sentences, the
defendant is effectively left with a choice between two different
sentences before plea negotiations can even begin.
Because it creates this disparity, Virginia’s mandatory jury
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. Jury sentencing may
serve a legitimate purpose by empowering a decision maker more
in touch with the “conscience of the community” than a judge—
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the jury. But by limiting the jury’s ability to review sentencing
guidelines and to make further modifications to sentences, this
particular jury sentencing scheme fails to serve this legitimate
purpose and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
During the Virginia General Assembly’s 2020 Regular
Session and a 2020 Special Session, lawmakers introduced a
variety of bills to modify jury sentencing. Among other things,
the bills would make jury sentencing optional for defendants.
This Note assesses those bills and determines whether they
adequately address the constitutional problem created by
Virginia’s mandatory jury sentencing scheme.
The Note cautions against a rosy impression of jury
sentencing. Instead, both academic and political figures must
reckon with the possibility that political actors could exploit the
practice to threaten a defendant’s fundamental right to a jury
trial.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2019, jurors convicted Antron Adon Tucker of
possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute,
transporting meth into Virginia, and possessing marijuana with
the intent to distribute.1 The jurors recommended a
fifty-one-year sentence for Tucker.2 Virginia’s sentencing
1. See Convicted Drug Dealer Gets 51-Year Sentence in Wythe, SWVA
TODAY (Nov. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZAA7-T5XX (describing Antron Adon
Tucker’s case and sentence).
2. Id.
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guidelines, which the jurors could not review,3 recommended a
six-year sentence.4 Virginia judges have the discretion to modify
the jury’s “recommended” sentence by, for example, suspending
the sentence in part or in full or by ordering that a defendant
serve sentences for multiple offenses concurrently.5 The judge
in Tucker’s case chose to fully impose the jury’s sentence.6
In June 2017, jurors convicted Norell Sterling Ward of two
counts of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute and one
count of conspiracy to distribute.7 The jurors recommended a
sixty-five-year sentence for Ward.8 Virginia’s sentencing
guidelines recommended a sentence of eight years and six
months.9 At a hearing, the judge chose not to suspend any of the
jury’s recommended sentence, but he did order Ward to serve
the two possession counts concurrently.10 This, along with the
untouched twenty-five-year recommended sentence for the

3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (“In cases tried by a jury,
the jury shall not be presented any information regarding sentencing
guidelines.”).
4. See Convicted Drug Dealer Gets 51-Year Sentence in Wythe, supra
note 1 (“State sentencing guidelines recommended a punishment of six years
in prison, but Tucker opted for a jury trial.”).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (“After conviction, whether with or
without jury, the court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the
sentence in whole or part and in addition may place the defendant on
probation under such conditions as the court shall determine . . . .”); id.
§ 19.2-308 (“When any person is convicted of two or more offenses, and
sentenced to confinement, such sentences shall not run concurrently, unless
expressly ordered by the court.”).
6. See Convicted Drug Dealer Gets 51-Year Sentence in Wythe, supra
note 1 (stating the judge’s decision and quoting the judge as saying that he
took the jury’s recommendation “very seriously”).
7. See Sean Gorman, Heroin Dealer from Charlottesville Sentenced to 45
Years, DAILY PROGRESS (Sept. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/XA8S-82SP
(explaining that a jury found the defendant guilty of three felonies).
8. See id. (describing the sixty-five-year sentence that was originally
recommended by the jury but that the judge later slightly lowered).
9. See VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY,
NORELL STERLING WARD (2017) [hereinafter VCSC WARD SENTENCING
GUIDELINES SUMMARY] (providing a summary of Norell Sterling Ward’s
convictions and the sentencing guidelines recommended punishment).
10. See Gorman, supra note 7.
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conspiracy charge, resulted in a forty-five-year punishment for
Ward.11
In March 2012, jurors convicted Robert Via Jr. of
conspiracy, armed burglary, robbery, four counts of abduction,
and firearms charges.12 The jurors recommended a 128-year
sentence for Via.13 By contrast, Via’s co-defendant pled guilty
and was sentenced by a judge to thirteen years in prison.14 The
judge declined to modify the jury’s sentence for Via despite
having received a letter from a juror imploring him to shorten
it.15 In the letter the juror stated, “I believe the jury may have
arrived at a different set of verdicts had we more information on
Virginia’s sentencing requirements and processes.”16
In a system where juries must recommend a sentence after
a noncapital jury trial, criminal defendants in Virginia face a
daunting choice when deciding how to adjudicate their cases:
should defendants exercise their Sixth Amendment17 right to a
jury trial, or should defendants waive that right to avoid
extreme jury sentences? Stories like those of Tucker, Ward, and
Via serve as stark examples of the potential danger of a jury
that cannot review the sentencing guidelines. Virginia criminal
defense law firms and lawyers have highlighted the impact that
blocking the jury from reviewing sentencing guidelines has on
11. See id. (outlining the judge’s modification of the jury’s sentence).
12. See Ashley Kelly, Hampton Juror Asks Judge to Lower 128-Year
Prison Sentence, DAILY PRESS (Sept. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/7B9H-NFYY
(describing a juror’s request to lower the jury’s recommended sentence and the
events that led to the trial).
13. See id. (explaining that “[t]he jurors sentenced [Via] to the mandatory
minimum on all counts,” resulting in a 128-year sentence recommendation).
14. Id.
15. See Peter Dujardin, In Fourth Hampton Jury Trial, Home Invasion
Defendant Gets 20 Years, DAILY PRESS (Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc
/2WFM-7VT2 (“After the jury gave [Via a 128-year punishment], the jury’s
foreman wrote to Circuit Judge Christopher W. Hutton, saying jurors would
have gone lower if they could have. But Hutton declined to suspend any of the
time, imposing all 128 years.”). The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and
remanded Via’s first case on grounds unrelated to his sentence. Id. After a
fourth trial, he received a twenty-year sentence. Id.
16. Kelly, supra note 12.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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jury sentence recommendations, at times delivering blunt
warnings to avoid jury trials altogether.18
This Note argues that Virginia’s mandatory jury sentencing
scheme, which bars juries from reviewing state sentencing
guidelines, places an impermissible burden on a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right by unnecessarily encouraging
defendants to waive jury trials. Data indicates that juries are
much more likely than a judge to recommend a sentence that is
more severe than what the sentencing guidelines recommend,
and judges are hesitant to modify jury sentences.19 Jury ability
to review the guidelines—a historical record that places the
defendant within the framework of all similarly situated
convicted defendants—would not impede the primary goal of
jury sentencing: allowing a decision maker more in touch with
the “conscience of the community” to determine an appropriate
punishment.20 Instead, the guidelines would allow a jury to
make a more informed recommendation by permitting it to use
a resource created in response to the abolition of parole and its
system of good credits. With the guidelines, juries could
determine sentences in light of the modern system of sentencing
in Virginia.21
Part I provides background on Virginia’s mandatory jury
sentencing scheme and presents data that illustrates why a
defendant may be hesitant to choose to have a jury trial under
that system. Jury trials are a somewhat rare phenomenon in
Virginia now, but when they do take place, juries frequently
recommend sentences that are longer than what the sentencing
guidelines would recommend.22 In addition, judges rarely
modify those recommended sentences.23 Part II identifies the
18. See, e.g., Jessica Wildeus, What Are Virginia Sentencing Guidelines?,
TINGEN WILLIAMS (June 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/6FLH-N5UQ (last updated
June 29, 2020) (“The jury is not bound by the same sentencing guidelines
Virginia judges must follow. Instead, Virginia juries only need to respect the
VA Code’s maximum and minimum sentencing statutes. For this reason, in
most cases Virginia lawyers recommend against requesting a jury trial.”).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra Part II.D.
22. See infra Part I.B.2.
23. See infra Part I.B.3.
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possible legitimate goals of jury sentencing and how, based on
those purposes, Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme places an
impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.
Part III discusses reforms members of Virginia’s General
Assembly have proposed and addresses whether the legislation
would adequately remedy the constitutional issue identified in
Part II. Part III also contends with the potential impact
legislative reform will have on Virginia’s criminal justice
system. The Note concludes by reflecting on the broader
implications of this Note.
I.

BACKGROUND AND DATA

This Part outlines Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme and
then assesses the impact that not allowing juries to review the
sentencing guidelines has had on jury sentences. Judges, but
not juries, can consider the guidelines’ recommended ranges
when they craft an appropriate sentence.24 Has that resulted in
a significant difference between the sentences that judges and
juries determine? This Part addresses that question by
analyzing data from the past twenty-five years.
A.

Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Sentencing
Guidelines
1.

Jury Sentencing in Virginia

Jury sentencing is not a recent phenomenon: the first
instance of jury discretion to choose sentences in felony cases in
the United States appeared in Virginia’s 1796 penal code.25
Today, Virginia is one of six states that continue to allow a jury
to recommend a sentence for convicted defendants in noncapital

24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (describing the
discretionary nature of the sentencing guidelines for judges but preventing
any party from presenting information about the guidelines to the jury).
25. See Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the
United States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 937 (2003) (describing the early
imposition of jury sentencing in Virginia and the westward expansion of the
practice).
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cases.26 However, only Virginia and Kentucky make jury
sentences after a jury trial mandatory;27 defendants in the other
states still have the ability to have only a judge determine their
sentence after trial.28
Virginia has a bifurcated jury trial system.29 First, the jury
determines guilt or innocence.30 If the jury convicts the
defendant, there is then a sentencing phase where the jury
hears additional evidence that may otherwise have been
inadmissible at the guilt phase, including evidence of prior
convictions.31
At the sentencing phase, the judge informs the jury of the
statutory minimum and maximum sentence for each charge.32
26. The other states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Texas. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295(A) (“[T]he term of confinement in the
state correctional facility or in jail and the amount of fine, if any, of a person
convicted of a criminal offense, shall be ascertained by the jury, or by the court
in cases tried without a jury.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2020) (outlining
Arkansas’s jury sentencing scheme); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West
2020) (same for Kentucky); MO. REV. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (2020) (same for
Missouri); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926.1 (West 2020) (same for Oklahoma);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) (West 2019) (same for Texas).
27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295(A) (providing that after a defendant is
convicted of a criminal offense, the punishment “shall be ascertained by the
jury” (emphasis added)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (“In the [sentencing]
hearing the jury will determine the punishment to be imposed within the
range provided elsewhere by law.”).
28. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (“After a jury finds guilt, the
defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court,
may waive jury sentencing, in which case the court shall impose
sentence . . . .”); MO. REV. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (providing that the judge and
not the jury may assess the proper punishment if the defendant requests it);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926.1 (“[T]he jury may, and shall upon the request
of the defendant assess and declare the punishment in their verdict within the
limitations fixed by law . . . .”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b)
(explaining that the judge shall assess the punishment unless the defendant
requests a jury sentence).
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (describing Virginia’s bifurcated jury
trial system).
30. See id. (explaining that the first phase of a trial is the guilt phase).
31. See id. (outlining the evidence that may be admitted at the separate
sentencing hearing).
32. See Jenia Ioncheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA.
L. REV. 311, 355 (2003) (“[In Virginia] juries do not have access to sentencing
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Juries may not review the state’s sentencing guidelines and no
party may present any information regarding the guidelines to
the jury.33 Juries also have no ability to recommend whether
sentences should be suspended or if sentences for multiple
counts should run consecutively or concurrently.34 Kentucky,
the only other state that makes jury sentencing mandatory after
jury trials, allows juries to recommend whether defendants
should serve sentences for multiple offenses concurrently.35
The jury’s decision on an appropriate sentence is advisory
in Virginia, and the judge has the authority to modify it in a
variety of ways; for example, the judge may decrease the
sentence, suspend the sentence, or order that a defendant serve
sentences for multiple counts concurrently.36 When jurors
recommend sentences for multiple counts, those sentences are
presented to the judge as sentences to be served consecutively.37
Unless the judge modifies the jury’s advisory sentence by
ordering the defendant to serve multiple sentences
concurrently, the defendant must serve the sentences
consecutively.38

guidelines or sentencing and probation statistics to help them arrive at a
verdict consistent with those rendered by other jurors for similar offenses.
Instead, jurors are provided only with statutory maximums and minimums
establishing a wide range of permissible sentences.”).
33. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (“In cases tried by a jury,
the jury shall not be presented any information regarding sentencing
guidelines.”).
34. See id. § 19.2-303 (providing that the court, but not stating that the
jury, may suspend a sentence or place the defendant on probation).
35. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 2020) (“The jury shall
recommend whether the sentences shall be served concurrently or
consecutively.”).
36. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (“After conviction, whether with or
without jury, the court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the
sentence in whole or part and in addition may place the defendant on
probation under such conditions as the court shall determine . . . .”); id.
§ 19.2-308 (“When any person is convicted of two or more offenses, and
sentenced to confinement, such sentences shall not run concurrently, unless
expressly ordered by the court.”).
37. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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2.

Virginia’s State Sentencing Guidelines

Virginia’s sentencing guidelines appeared as a result of the
enactment of truth-in-sentencing laws in the mid-1990s.39 In
1994, the General Assembly abolished parole, requiring
convicted felons to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence.40
The General Assembly also eliminated the system of sentence
credits awarded to inmates for good behavior.41 Virginia
established the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission
(“VCSC”) to develop and administer the guidelines.42
Upon formation, the VCSC developed a series of
recommended sentencing ranges for each felony offense that
reflected the average incarceration time for similarly situated
offenders before the abolition of parole.43 In many cases, the
recommended sentencing range falls below the statutory
minimum sentence for a particular offense because before the
abolition of parole offenders often served less time than what

39. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (“Any person sentenced to a term of
incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall
not be eligible for parole upon that offense.”); Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L.
Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 885, 893 (2004) (“Virginia abolished parole and adopted voluntary
judicial sentencing guidelines in 1995, calibrating the recommended new
sentence ranges for many offenses so that they replicated actual time served
under the former parole system.”).
40. See 2019 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL
REPORT 11, [hereinafter 2019 VCSC REPORT], https://perma.cc/D3NT-GA6D
(PDF) (“Under Virginia’s truth-in-sentencing laws, convicted felons must
serve at least 85% of the pronounced sentence and they may earn, at most,
15% off in sentence credits, regardless of whether their sentence is served in
a state facility or a local jail.”).
41. See id. (“Beginning January 1, 1995, the practice of discretionary
parole release was abolished in Virginia and the existing system of sentence
credits awarded to inmates for good behavior was eliminated.”).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803 (2020) (describing the powers and
duties of the VCSC).
43. See id. § 17.1-805 (providing that the Commission shall establish a
set of sentencing guidelines and that recommended ranges shall be
determined by the “actual time-served distribution for similarly situated
offenders, in terms of their conviction offense and prior criminal history”).
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the minimum level of punishment required.44 When this
happens, to remain in compliance with the guidelines
recommendation, judges must suspend a sentence in whole or in
part or order that the defendant serve sentences for multiple
offenses concurrently.45 For example, while the statutory
minimum for a particular drug offense may be five years, the
guidelines may recommend a punishment of only one year,
implying that the judge should suspend all but one year of that
five-year minimum sentence.46 The recommended sentences are
“effective time” sentences, which means that the defendant’s
incarceration time equals the suspended time subtracted from
the total imposed time.47 Juries cannot recommend a
punishment below the statutory minimum level, so if the
guidelines recommend a punishment below the minimum, a
judge must modify the jury’s sentence.48
The median time served for a particular offense is the
midpoint of each recommended sentencing range.49 The
sentence length recommendation is the midpoint, and it is
accompanied by a high-end and low-end recommendation.50

44. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 911 (“Specifically, many drug and
property offenses carry a statutory minimum term of two or five years, but the
guidelines ranges for these nonviolent offenses, designed to approximate the
actual pre-guidelines sentences served, call for much shorter terms.”).
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 911 (“[P]rior to the abolition of
parole, a drug offender sentenced to the statutory minimum five years often
served less than a year.”).
47. See ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., JURISDICTION PROFILE:
VIRGINIA 9 (2020), https://perma.cc/864J-2ZDG (PDF) (explaining the
difference between effective time and imposed time sentences and that the
sentencing guidelines recommend effective time sentences).
48. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 911 (providing that the judge but
not the jury has the ability to modify sentences to levels below the statutory
minimum level).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-805 (2020) (explaining that “[t]he midpoint
of each initial recommended sentencing range shall be the median time served
for the middle two quartiles and subject to” a variety of “enhancements”
unique to each felony offense).
50. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 16 (“For cases
recommended for incarceration of more than six months, the sentence length
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The VCSC developed and continues to update worksheets
pertaining to different offenses, including Assault, Drug, Fraud,
and Murder/Homicide.51 Worksheets use a scoring system to
determine the appropriate level of punishment, adding points
for a variety of circumstances present when the crime took
place.52 For example, the Drug/Other worksheet asks whether
there are additional offenses, whether a knife or firearm was in
possession at the time of the offense, whether the defendant has
any prior convictions, whether the defendant has a prior
juvenile record, or whether the defendant was on supervised
probation when the offense took place.53 Midpoints increase
when the defendant was previously convicted of a violent
felony.54
The court must complete sentencing guidelines worksheets
in all felony cases covered by the guidelines.55 The guidelines
are discretionary, but when the court departs from the
recommended range in both jury and non-jury cases, “the court
shall file with the record of the case a written explanation of
such departure.”56 These worksheets are sent to the VCSC.57
Aware that the General Assembly—which elects state

recommendation derived from the guidelines (known as the midpoint) is
accompanied by a high-end and low-end recommendation.”).
51. See Worksheets, VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, https://perma.cc/9DYGA8K9 (providing the 2020 sentencing guidelines worksheets).
52. See 2020 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION DRUG/OTHER
WORKSHEET 3–6, https://perma.cc/Q2VS-YYXB (PDF) (outlining the scoring
system for a drug offense).
53. See id. at 3 (giving scores for various factors).
54. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-805 (detailing how prior convictions and
violent history impact midpoints for the initial recommended sentencing
range).
55. See id. § 19.2-298.01 (“In all felony cases, other than Class 1 felonies,
the court shall (i) have presented to it the appropriate discretionary sentencing
guidelines worksheets and (ii) review and consider the suitability of the
applicable discretionary sentencing guidelines . . . .”).
56. Id.
57. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 2 (“The clerk of the circuit
court is responsible for sending the completed and signed worksheets to the
Commission.”).
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judges58—will know when they depart from the guidelines,
judges feel pressure to impose guidelines recommendations.59
B.
1.

Data

Percentage of Felony Convictions Adjudicated by Juries

Studying the breakdown of how felony convictions were
adjudicated may shed light on how willing or unwilling Virginia
defendants have been to have a jury determine their sentence.
A relevant comparison is the difference between the percentage
of felony convictions resulting from jury trials and those
resulting from bench trials. A higher percentage of bench trials
than jury trials may indicate that defendants, while desiring to
try their cases rather than plead guilty, are more willing to have
a bench rather than a jury trial, where the judge can use the
sentencing guidelines to determine a sentence.
In 2019, jury trials made up just over 1.3 percent of all cases
in Virginia that resulted in a felony conviction.60 By contrast,
bench trials made up 9 percent of all cases and guilty pleas made
up 90 percent.61 The percentage of convictions resulting from a
jury trial was around 4 percent in the years leading up to 1995—
when
the
General
Assembly
implemented
the
truth-in-sentencing reforms62—but has since declined nearly 3
percentage points, a 75 percent decrease in value.63
Across Virginia, bench trials make up a larger fraction of
felony cases that resulted in a conviction than jury trials: in

58. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (“The judges of all other courts of record
shall be chosen by the vote of the majority of the members elected to each
house of the General Assembly for terms of eight years.”).
59. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 916 (interviewing a group of
Virginia judges, one of whom said, “In our state, what the General Assembly
is looking for is that we stay within the guidelines. When we went to sentence
guidelines and abolished parole their hope was that there wouldn’t be an
explosion in the prison population”).
60. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27.
61. Id.
62. See supra Part I.A.2.
63. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27.
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2019 alone, bench trials made up 7.7 percent more of the cases.64
Perhaps defendants are more inclined to have a legal expert
decide their cases, but the information disparity in sentencing
discussed above may also play a role.
These state statistics mirror a national trend towards more
guilty pleas and a rapidly diminishing number of jury trials. Of
all felony convictions at the federal level during the
twelve-month period ending on June 30, 2019, 97.8 percent
resulted from guilty pleas, 2.0 percent resulted from jury trials,
and just 0.2 percent resulted from bench trials.65 In 2018 in
Texas, a state with optional jury sentencing,66 94 percent of
felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas, 4 percent resulted
from bench trials, and 2 percent resulted from jury trials.67
The starkest difference between Virginia and these other
jurisdictions is the percentage of felony convictions that result
from bench trials. In Virginia in 2019, 9 percent of felony
convictions resulted from bench trials,68 while in Texas in 2018
the percentage was 4 percent69 and at the federal level it was
just 0.2 percent.70 The percentage of felony convictions resulting
from trials—both bench and jury trials—was higher in Virginia
than these other jurisdictions: 10.3 percent in Virginia,71 6
percent in Texas,72 and 2.2 percent at the federal level.73 In sum,
it appears that while Virginia defendants may be more willing
to have a trial, they are much more eager than defendants in
Texas or at the federal level to have a bench trial where a judge

64. Id.
65. Table D-4—U.S. District Courts—Criminal Statistical Tables for the
Federal Judiciary (June 30, 2019), U.S. CTS., https://perma.cc/ED7V-Y5JB
[hereinafter 2019 U.S. District Courts Table] (download data table).
66. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67. 2018 TEX. JUDICIARY ANN. STAT. REP. CT.-LEVEL 21 [hereinafter 2018
TEXAS REPORT], https://perma.cc/H9B3-FWG4 (PDF).
68. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27.
69. 2018 TEXAS REPORT, supra note 67, at CT.-LEVEL 21.
70. 2019 U.S. District Courts Table, supra note 65.
71. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27.
72. 2018 TEXAS REPORT, supra note 67, at 21.
73. 2019 U.S. District Courts Table, supra note 65.
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will determine their sentence instead of a jury trial where a jury
must recommend a sentence.
2.

Sentencing Guidelines Compliance

Based on stories about individual cases alone, criminal
defense lawyers in Virginia are aware of the inherent risk of
going to a jury trial under mandatory jury sentencing—if
convicted, juries must recommend a sentence with no ability to
review the sentencing guidelines, and juries frequently deviate
from what guidelines recommend.74 But how often do juries
really deviate from the guidelines? Is deviation limited to
extreme cases like those of Tucker, Ward, and Via,75 or is it
much more widespread? This section seeks to answer those
questions by comparing the rates at which judges and juries
comply with the guidelines and how often they recommend
sentences that are harsher or less severe than guideline
recommendations.
The VCSC releases an annual report that includes a
breakdown of “Guidelines Concurrence,” defined as “judicial
agreement with the sentencing guidelines . . . .”76 The
Commission reviews all guidelines worksheets and analyzes
them to determine judicial compliance with the guidelines.77
The extent to which the decision maker agrees with the
guidelines recommended ranges is the “concurrence” or
“compliance” rate.78 The “aggravation rate” is the rate at which
the decision maker sentences defendants “to sanctions more
severe than the guidelines recommendation . . . .”79 For the

74. See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.
75. See supra INTRODUCTION.
76. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 12.
77. See id. at 2 (describing the process by which courts complete and
submit worksheets and the Commission’s analysis of those worksheets for
completeness and concurrence).
78. See id. at 14 (“The overall concurrence rate summarizes the extent to
which Virginia’s judges concur with recommendations provided by the
sentencing guidelines, both in type of disposition and in length of
incarceration.”).
79. Id.
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purpose of remaining consistent with the VCSC’s own
terminology, this Note will refer to the rate of “upward
departures” from guideline recommendations as the
“aggravation rate.” They are, however, the same concept.
Finally, the “mitigation rate” is “the rate at which [the decision
maker] sentences offenders to sanctions less severe than the
guidelines recommendation . . . .”80 This Note will refer to the
rate of “downward departures” from guideline recommendations
as the “mitigation rate” in order to remain consistent with
Commission terminology.
The Commission has tracked and published these rates in
its annual reports for every type of criminal adjudication—
guilty plea, bench trial, and jury trial—since its establishment
in 1995.81
Table 1: Average Guidelines Concurrence 1995–201982
Judges
Juries
Compliance
79.6%
41.8%
Rate
Aggravation
9.9%
46.6%
Rate
Mitigation Rate 10.5%
11.6%
In 2019, judges accepted guideline recommendations in
83.9 percent of cases.83 The aggravation rate was 7.4 percent,
and the mitigation rate was 8.7 percent.84 This compliance rate
reflects the trend that the judge compliance rate has gradually
increased from the inception of the guidelines to now: in 1995,
judge compliance was 75 percent, the aggravation rate was 14.5

80. Id.
81. See infra Appendix 1 (listing the compliance, aggravation, and
mitigation rates for judges and juries from 1995–2019 as listed in the VCSC’s
annual reports).
82. Id.
83. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
84. Id.
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percent, and the mitigation rate was 10.5 percent.85 The average
judge compliance rate between 1995 and 2019 was 79.6 percent,
the average aggravation rate was 9.9 percent, and the average
mitigation rate was 10.5 percent.86
Juries on the other hand complied with guideline
recommendations only 49.7 percent of the time in 2019,
unwittingly deviating from the guidelines far more often than
judges.87 The aggravation rate, 36.7 percent, was over four times
higher than the 2019 judge aggravation rate (7.4 percent).88
However, the mitigation rate, 13.6 percent, was much closer to
the judge mitigation rate (8.7 percent).89 When deviating from
guideline recommendations, juries were therefore much more
likely to return a more severe sentence than what the guidelines
would recommend than they were to return a less severe
sentence.
Deprived of any information relating to the guidelines,
juries have unsurprisingly shown no general trend towards
complying with them since 1995.90 In 1995, the jury compliance
rate was 49.2 percent,91 which was higher than any year except
2019, when it was 49.7 percent.92 Between 1995 and 2019, the
jury compliance rate oscillated from year to year; for example,
in 2014, the compliance rate was 32.2 percent,93 but just one

85. 1995 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORTED
41 [hereinafter 1995 VCSC REPORT], https://perma.cc/GF6A-A4DA (PDF).
86. See infra Appendix 1 (averaging the twenty-five years of compliance,
aggravation, and mitigation rates that the Commission has provided in its
annual reports since 1995).
87. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See infra Appendix 1.
91. 1995 VCSC REPORT, supra note 85, at 56.
92. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; see infra Appendix 1
(providing jury compliance rates from 1995 until 2019 as reported by the
VCSC).
93. 2014 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 35,
https://perma.cc/W94M-PQFC (PDF).
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year later in 2015 it increased to 43.3 percent,94 and by 2018 the
rate dipped back down to 39.4 percent.95
Figure 196

Jury Guidelines Concurrence
Rate (%)

60
40
20
0

Year
Compliance

Aggravation

Mitigation

The average jury compliance rate from 1995–2019 was 41.8
percent, the average aggravation rate was 46.6 percent, and the
average mitigation rate was 11.6 percent.97 Figure 1
demonstrates that the compliance and aggravation rates were
somewhat unpredictable during this period.98 In 2019, the
compliance rate was 49.7 percent and the aggravation rate was
36.7 percent,99 while in 2001 the compliance rate was 30.4
percent and the aggravation rate was 56.2 percent.100 The 2001
rates reflected the general trend where the aggravation rate was
94. 2015 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 37,
https://perma.cc/7MVK-GB9B (PDF).
95. 2018 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 27,
https://perma.cc/MM3U-CPU7 (PDF).
96. See infra Appendix 1 (listing jury compliance, aggravation, and
mitigation rates from 1995 until 2019 as reported by the VCSC).
97. See id. (averaging the jury compliance, aggravation, and mitigation
rates from 1995 until 2019 as reported by the VCSC).
98. See supra Figure 1.
99. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
100. 2001 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT,
https://perma.cc/3WRN-VYET (PDF).
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higher than the compliance rate—in twenty out of the
twenty-five years since truth-in-sentencing began, the jury
aggravation rate was higher than the compliance rate.101
In sum, in any given year, a jury is more likely than a judge
to recommend a sentence that is more severe than what the
guidelines recommend.102 Furthermore, judges are more likely
than a jury to comply with the guidelines, while there is a
roughly equal chance that a judge or jury will impose a sentence
that is less severe than what the guidelines would
recommend.103
3.

Judge Modifications of Jury Sentences

Jury sentences are recommendations: judges may choose to
impose the sentence as recommended, but they also have the
power to modify the recommendations by choosing, among other
things, to suspend the sentence in whole or in part or by
choosing to order that the defendant serve sentences for
multiple offenses concurrently.104 Should defendants, aware
that juries are much more likely to recommend sentences that
are harsher than guideline ranges, feel comforted by the judge’s
power to modify a jury’s sentence and feel more confident about
choosing to have a jury trial? Do judges routinely respond to
harsh jury sentences by bringing them back into compliance
with the guidelines?
Judges rarely modify jury sentences. In 2019, judges
modified just 9 percent of jury sentences.105 The VCSC has only
tracked the exact percentage of jury sentences modified by a
judge since 2004, but the average percentage of jury sentences
that judges modified from 2004–2019 was 18.9 percent.106

101. See infra Appendix 1 (providing the jury compliance and aggravation
rates from 1995–2019 as reported by the VCSC).
102. See supra Table 1.
103. See supra Table 1.
104. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
105. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
106. See infra Appendix 1 (listing and averaging the judge modification of
jury sentence rates from 2004–2019 as reported by the VCSC).
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Judge Modification Rate
(%)

At 9 percent, the percentage of jury sentences that judges
modified in 2019 is fairly low relative to the average
modification rate of 18.9 percent.107 In addition, as noted
above,108 the jury’s 49.7 percent compliance rate in 2019 was,
relative to other years, fairly high and the 36.7 percent
aggravation rate was relatively low.109 This juxtaposition of a
high jury compliance rate, a low aggravation rate, and a low
judge modification rate raises the question of whether there is a
relationship between judge modification of jury sentences and
aggravation rates. Put another way, are judge modification
rates higher when aggravation rates are also higher, suggesting
that judges respond to more severe punishments by making
them less severe?110
Figure 2
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The correlation coefficient between aggravation rates since
2004 and judge modification rates since 2004 is 0.39, which
suggests a moderately weak to moderately positive relationship

107. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; see infra Appendix 1.
108. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
109. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; see infra Appendix 1.
110. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29 (explaining that judges
may only lower, not increase, a sentence that the jury recommends).
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between the two variables.111 This means that as aggravation
rates go up, judge modification rates are moderately likely to go
up as well. However, excluding 2019’s aggravation and judge
modification rates, the correlation coefficient is 0.10, which
suggests a much weaker relationship between the two variables,
meaning that aggravation rates have little to no impact on judge
modification rates overall.112 This impact on the overall
correlation coefficient in addition to Figure 2 indicate that the
2019 judge modification rate may be an outlier.113
In any case, with only fifteen years of data, this data set is
small, and it is difficult at this early stage to definitively
determine a relationship between these two variables. In
addition, any number of factors could explain a judge’s decision
to modify a jury’s sentence,114 so it is not possible to conclusively
state that there is a weak probability that a judge will modify a
jury’s sentence if it is much more severe than what the
guidelines would recommend. However, these low correlation
coefficients in addition to the individual cases discussed in Part
I demonstrate that one cannot also conclude that judges are
strongly likely to modify a jury’s sentence if it goes above the
recommended sentence.115
4.

Data Takeaways

As in many jurisdictions, the percentage of convictions
adjudicated by jury trial rapidly declined in Virginia over the

111. See infra Appendix 1 (providing the judge modification rates and jury
aggravation rates from 2004–2019 and calculating the correlation between the
two variables); Haldun Akoglu, User’s Guide to Correlation Coefficients, 18
TURKISH J. MED. 91, 91–93 (2018), https://perma.cc/7CXL-4Q4Z (PDF)
(discussing what different correlation coefficient values mean).
112. See infra Appendix 1.
113. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29 (listing a judge
modification rate of nine percent).
114. See id. at 17 (providing the most common reasons judges departed
from the guidelines, including “defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement”
as a reason to sentence below the guidelines, and “the severity or degree of
prior record” as a reason to sentence above the guidelines).
115. See supra INTRODUCTION.
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past twenty-five years.116 However, relative to Texas—a state
with optional jury sentencing117—and federal courts, the
percentage of convictions adjudicated by bench trials is much
higher in Virginia.118 The significant chance that a jury could
recommend a sentence above the sentencing guidelines
recommended range and the relatively safe assumption that a
judge would impose the sentencing guidelines recommendation
may be driving this trend.119 This disparity between jury and
judge sentences, in conjunction with the reality that judges
usually avoid modifying jury sentences,120 serves as a strong
incentive for a defendant in Virginia to waive his or her right to
a jury trial.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
IMPERMISSIBLE BURDENS ON A DEFENDANT’S SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT AND VIRGINIA JURY SENTENCING
Under a mandatory jury sentencing scheme in Virginia, a
jury is much more likely than a judge to recommend a sentence
that is more severe than what the sentencing guidelines
recommend, while judges are more inclined to impose what the
guidelines recommend.121 Does Virginia’s jury sentencing
scheme place an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right by forcing him to choose between a decision
maker that can review the sentencing guidelines and one that
cannot? This Part analyzes that question as it relates to
Supreme Court jurisprudence on impermissible burdens on
constitutional rights and retaliation.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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United States v. Jackson and Needless Encouragements of
Guilty Pleas and Jury Waivers

Soon after the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee to a right to a jury trial to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,122 the Court addressed
several state and federal statutory schemes to determine
whether the scheme structures impermissibly burdened a
defendant’s right to a jury trial.123
In United States v. Jackson,124 the Court struck down a
provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act125 that only allowed
juries to impose the death penalty for a violation of the Act.126
In making this determination, the Court referenced Congress’s
purpose in structuring the statute this way: Congress aimed to
make it possible only for a jury, not a judge, to impose the death
penalty.127 While the Court noted that this was a “legitimate”
goal, the Court also found that the “goal can be achieved without
penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and demand
jury trial.”128 For example, Congress could allow the jury to
choose between life imprisonment and the death penalty in
every case, including after guilty pleas.129 As a result, the Court

122. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because we
believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right
of jury trial in all criminal cases which . . . would come within the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee.”).
123. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 570–71 (1968) (analyzing
the Federal Kidnapping Act); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 214–16
(1978) (addressing New Jersey’s homicide statutes).
124. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
125. Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201).
126. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 591.
127. Id. at 582.
128. Id.
129. See id. (“In some States, for example, the choice between life
imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in every case—
regardless of how the defendant’s guilt has been determined.”).
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found that the death penalty clause of the Act was
unenforceable.130
The Court elaborated that “the evil in the federal statute is
not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but
simply that it needlessly encourages them.”131 Procedures do not
need to be “inherently coercive” to meet this threshold.132 Some
guilty pleas may still be voluntary under a statutory scheme
that imposes an impermissible burden on a defendant’s
constitutional right.133 The critical inquiry is whether,
referencing the legitimate purpose in structuring the statutory
system, the statutory scheme “needlessly” encourages guilty
pleas and jury waivers.134 If there are alternative ways to
achieve that legitimate purpose without encouraging guilty
pleas and jury waivers, then the particular procedure imposes
an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right.135
Professor Loftus Becker construed Jackson as creating a
two-part inquiry.136 First, does the statutory system have any
legitimate purpose, other than chilling the constitutional rights
of those who assert them?137 Failing to assert a legitimate
purpose results in a per se impermissible burden on a
130. See id. at 582–83 (finding that because there were alternative ways
to limit “the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it,” the death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act could not “be justified by its
ostensible purpose”).
131. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. See id. (finding that the death penalty provision’s tendency to
encourage defendants to waive jury trial does not mean every guilty plea is
involuntary).
134. See id. at 582 (“The question is not whether the chilling effect is
‘incidental’ rather than intentional; the question is whether the effect is
unnecessary and therefore excessive.”).
135. See id. at 582–83 (finding that, after identifying alternative ways to
limit the imposition of the death penalty, “Congress cannot impose such a
penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional
right”).
136. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 793 (1988).
137. Id.
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constitutional right.138 In Jackson, the Court found that the
government’s goal of limiting the imposition of the death
penalty to cases where the jury recommends it was legitimate.139
Second, are the particular characteristics of the system
necessary to implement the legitimate purposes served?140 The
Jackson Court found that the death penalty clause failed to pass
this test; the government could find other ways to limit the
imposition of the death penalty to cases in which a jury
recommends it without burdening a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.141
This Note argues that Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme, by
not allowing the jury to review the sentencing guidelines, fails
Jackson’s two-part test. First, Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme
may serve a legitimate purpose.142 For example, the jury may be
the more appropriate decision maker, as the conscience of the
community, to determine the appropriate level of punishment.
However, blocking the jury’s access to the sentencing
guidelines—a record of how decision makers have sentenced
similarly situated defendants in the past—is not necessary to
implement jury sentencing’s legitimate purposes, and it
needlessly encourages Virginia defendants to waive their right
to a jury trial.143
B.

The Current Status of Jackson

Before fully analyzing Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme,
however, this Note must address how subsequent Supreme
138. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (“If the
provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it
would be patently unconstitutional.”).
139. See id. at 582 (“The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in
which a jury recommends it is an entirely legitimate one.”).
140. Becker, supra note 136, at 793.
141. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582 (discussing alternative ways to only
allow a jury to impose the death penalty, including leaving “the choice between
life imprisonment and capital punishment” to a jury in every case, “regardless
of how the defendant’s guilt has been determined”).
142. See infra Part II.C.1.
143. See infra Part II.C.2.
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Court cases have impacted the scope of Jackson and the test
identified by Professor Becker.
1.

Clarifying Then Narrowing the Scope of Jackson

Two years after Jackson, the Supreme Court held in Brady
v. United States144 that a defendant’s guilty plea—after he was
charged under the same Federal Kidnapping Act before Jackson
was decided—was not involuntary.145 The Court in Jackson had
explicitly stated that not all guilty pleas under a statutory
scheme that imposes an impermissible burden on a defendant’s
constitutional rights are involuntary.146 Accordingly, the Court
in Brady found that Jackson did not fashion “a new standard for
judging the validity of guilty pleas” and that guilty pleas are not
necessarily compelled or invalid when the defendant wants to
accept a lesser penalty rather than risk receiving a harsher one
at trial.147 The Court left untouched the two-pronged approach
that identifies (1) the legitimate purpose a statutory system
serves and (2) whether the characteristics of that system are
necessary to achieve that purpose.148
The scope of Jackson became less clear after Corbitt v. New
Jersey.149 In Corbitt, the Court reviewed the New Jersey
homicide statutes, which provided that defendants convicted of
first-degree murder by a jury were subject to mandatory life
imprisonment, while defendants that pled guilty received either

144. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
145. See id. at 752 (“We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty
rather than face a wider range of possibilities . . . .”).
146. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583 (“Thus the fact that the Federal
Kidnaping Act tends to discourage defendants from insisting upon their
innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that every defendant
who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily.”).
147. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747.
148. See id. at 745–48 (summarizing the Court’s holding in Jackson that
relied on identifying the legitimate goal of limiting the imposition of the death
penalty and the unnecessary way Congress chose to achieve that goal).
149. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
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life imprisonment or a lesser sentence.150 The Court
distinguished Jackson, noting that pleading guilty to homicide
did not guarantee a lower sentence than if the defendant had
requested a jury trial: a judge could still impose a life
sentence.151 By contrast, a defendant charged under the Federal
Kidnapping Act in Jackson could no longer receive the death
penalty if she pled guilty.152
The Court, addressing Jackson, found that “not every
burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every
pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”153
The chance that a defendant would receive a more lenient
sentence by waiving a jury trial did not invalidate the
defendant’s guilty plea.154 Such a scheme furthers a state’s
interest in encouraging guilty pleas, creating a system that
benefits both the state and defendants.155
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, in essence argued
that the statutory scheme in Corbitt failed the first prong of
Jackson’s test identified by Professor Becker—the scheme
served no other purpose than to penalize the defendant’s right
to plead not guilty.156 New Jersey provided no legitimate
purpose for the characteristics of the homicide statutes other

150. Id. at 214–16.
151. Id. at 217–18.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 218.
154. See id. at 221 (“In Bordenkircher, the probability or certainty of
leniency in return for a plea did not invalidate the mandatory penalty imposed
after a jury trial.”).
155. See id. at 222 (finding that the “State’s legitimate interest in
encouraging the entry of guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargaining” is “a
process mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the State”).
156. See id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] statute that has no other
purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the right not to plead guilty is
‘patently unconstitutional.’ The Court so held in [Jackson], and that holding
is dispositive of this case.” (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
581 (1968))).
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than to encourage guilty pleas to conserve prosecutorial
resources.157
Justice Stevens noted that under this particular scheme,
the defendant faced a harsher potential penalty if he demanded
a jury trial: he would receive a mandatory life sentence if found
guilty, while if he pled guilty the judge may impose a life
sentence or even no sentence at all.158 The effect of this system—
one that included a more severe range of statutory penalties
after a jury trial—was that a defendant found guilty after a jury
trial was punished not only for the conduct in committing the
offense but also for the “offense” of entering a “false” not-guilty
plea.159
Because New Jersey failed to enunciate any purpose for its
homicide statutory system other than to encourage defendants
to plead guilty, Justice Stevens did not address whether the
particular characteristics of the statutory system were
necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.160 While Justice
Stevens noted that the majority did not overrule Jackson, he
lamented that the majority divorced Jackson “from the rationale
on which it rested.”161
2.

Modern Application of Jackson

After Corbitt, the question is: what is left of Jackson?

157. See id. (“New Jersey does not seriously contend that [the homicide
statute] has any purpose or effect other than to penalize the assertion of the
right not to plead guilty.”).
158. Id. at 230–31.
159. Id. at 232; see Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37,
58 (“In some cases, the unconscionable nature of the plea bargaining process
induces defendants who would otherwise be acquitted at trial to plead
guilty.”).
160. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 229 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Jackson’s holding that “a statute that has no other
purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the right not to plead guilty is
‘patently unconstitutional’” was dispositive of this case).
161. Id.
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Reconciling Jackson and Corbitt

The strictest reading of Corbitt would essentially overrule
Jackson. By failing to articulate a legitimate purpose for the
statutory scheme at issue, the Court in Corbitt did not use the
same type of analysis to determine whether a statutory scheme
had placed an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights.162 Instead, the Court solely focused on
a state’s interest in encouraging guilty pleas to save
prosecutorial costs.163
However, while the Court did not use the same analysis laid
out in Jackson, the Court did not explicitly overrule Jackson.164
The Court distinguished Jackson, finding that Corbitt’s case did
not involve the death penalty and the statutory scheme at issue
did not allow the defendant to escape the maximum possible
punishment by pleading guilty.165 Under a narrow reading of
both Jackson and Corbitt, two factors must be present for
Jackson to be relevant and binding. First, the statutory scheme
must include the death penalty as a potential punishment.166

162. See id. (arguing that Jackson mandates that states must establish a
purpose for a statute other than simply encouraging defendants to plead
guilty).
163. See id. at 218–19 (majority opinion) (“Specifically, there is no per se
rule against encouraging guilty pleas. We have squarely held that a State may
encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the
plea.”).
164. Cf. id. at 217 (“[T]here are substantial differences between this case
and Jackson, and . . . Jackson does not require a reversal of Corbitt’s
conviction.”).
165. See id. (distinguishing Jackson on the grounds that “[f]irst, the death
penalty, which is ‘unique in its severity and irrevocability,’ . . . is not involved
here” and second, while the defendant in Jackson could avoid the maximum
penalty by pleading guilty, the defendant in Corbitt could not).
166. See id. (noting that the death penalty, which is “unique in its severity
and irrevocability,” was present in the Federal Kidnapping Act, but it was not
in the New Jersey statutory scheme). But see id. (articulating that the Court
“need not agree with the New Jersey court that the Jackson rationale is
limited to those cases where a plea avoids any possibility of the death penalty’s
being imposed” but that the absence of the death penalty “is a material fact”).
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Second, the defendant must be able to avoid a harsher
punishment by waiving a jury trial.167
The underlying rationale of Jackson, however, went beyond
these two factors alone—Justice Stevens noted that Jackson’s
rationale required courts to identify a legitimate purpose for the
statutory system that allegedly encouraged guilty pleas and
jury waivers; any system that did so with no other purpose than
to chill a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights was
“patently unconstitutional.”168
b.

Jackson as a Retaliation Case

More recently in Wilkie v. Robbins,169 the Court cited
Jackson as an example of a retaliation case to illustrate the
Court’s “longstanding recognition that the Government may not
retaliate for exercising First Amendment speech rights . . . or
certain others of constitutional rank.”170 According to the Court,
retaliation cases “turn on an allegation of impermissible
purpose and motivation . . . .”171
In Jackson, the Government had a legitimate purpose when
it only allowed a jury to impose the death penalty: it wanted to
limit the imposition of the death penalty to cases where the jury
recommended it.172 But that purpose was “impermissible” under
that particular statutory scheme.173 Because the legitimate
167. See id. (“[I]n Jackson, any risk of suffering the maximum penalty
could be avoided by pleading guilty. Here . . . the risk of [life imprisonment] is
not completely avoided by pleading non vult because the judge accepting the
plea has the authority to impose a life term.”).
168. See id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Jackson held that
“a statute that has no other purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the
right not to plead guilty is ‘patently unconstitutional’” and that the entry of a
guilty plea “cannot at once be criminally punishable and constitutionally
protected”).
169. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
170. Id. at 555–56.
171. Id. at 556.
172. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (“The goal of
limiting the death penalty to cases [in] which a jury recommends it is an
entirely legitimate one.”).
173. Id. at 572.
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purpose could be achieved in a way that did not needlessly
encourage defendants to waive jury trials or plead guilty, the
death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act
amounted
to
retaliation
and
was
accordingly
unconstitutional.174
This Note argues that Jackson remains apposite in cases
where there is an impermissible purpose or motivation
underlying the statutory system at issue. Such an
impermissible purpose or motivation is present when statutory
schemes needlessly encourage guilty pleas and jury waivers.175
With no necessary link to a legitimate purpose, a particular
characteristic of a statutory scheme that encourages guilty
pleas or jury waivers rises to the level of retaliation and is
accordingly invalid.176
A court honoring Corbitt may point out that New Jersey and
other states may structure their criminal statutes in ways that
encourage defendants to plead guilty and waive a jury trial to
receive a more lenient sentence.177 New Jersey’s homicide
statute was not a form of “retaliation” because the state
legislature operated within permissible bounds to induce
defendants into pleading guilty.178
But this runs in tension with the Court’s earlier
announcement that actions where the “legislature, prosecutor,

174. See id. at 582 (“Whatever the power of Congress to impose a death
penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnaping Act, Congress cannot impose
such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a
constitutional right.”).
175. See id. (“Whatever might be said of Congress’ objectives, they cannot
be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional
rights.”).
176. See id. (finding that while Congress’ goal to limit the imposition of the
death penalty was legitimate, the method it chose to do so was invalid because
there were alternative ways to achieve the goal without encouraging guilty
pleas and jury waivers).
177. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 220 (1978) (reiterating that
deciding to avoid a potentially harsher punishment is a difficult choice that is
an inevitable and permissible aspect of a legitimate system that encourages
the negotiation of pleas).
178. See id. at 219 (“We have squarely held that a State may encourage a
guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea.”).
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judge, or all three ‘deliberately employ their charging and
sentencing powers to induce [a] defendant to tender a plea of
guilty,’ and where they do so with the ‘objective [of] penaliz[ing]
a person’s reliance on his legal rights, [are] ‘patently
unconstitutional.’”179 Plea negotiations play an important role
in providing the defendant with options—and at times
leverage—in the pretrial phase.180 But a statutory system that
needlessly encourages defendants to waive their constitutional
rights is still invalid.181
Jackson was a retaliation case because, prior to any plea
negotiations, the defendant needlessly faced a much harsher
penalty if he asserted his right to a jury trial.182 Congress, in
limiting the death penalty to those defendants that asserted
their constitutional right, “deliberately employ[ed] [its]
charging and sentencing powers to induce [a] defendant to
tender a plea of guilty.”183 That impermissible congressional
purpose was evidence of retaliation in Jackson, which the Court
confirmed in Wilkie.184
C.

Is Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme a Form of
Retaliation?

Data demonstrating a jury’s tendency to recommend a
sentence that is harsher than what the guidelines and judges
would recommend in addition to the low probability that a judge
will modify a severe jury sentence indicates that defendants
have a strong incentive to waive their Sixth Amendment right
179. Id. at 232 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 n.8 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
363 (1978)).
180. See id. at 222 (majority opinion) (describing the plea bargaining
process as a “process mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the State”).
181. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583 (“For the evil in the federal statute is
not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it
needlessly encourages them.”).
182. See id. (“Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that
needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right.”).
183. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8 (1970).
184. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 556 (2007) (“Those [retaliation]
cases turn on an allegation of impermissible purpose and motivation.”).
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under mandatory jury sentencing.185 The question, however, is
whether Virginia’s statutory scheme for jury sentencing places
an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.
Answering this question requires analyzing whether the
statutory scheme reveals an impermissible purpose or
motivation on the part of the Virginia General Assembly in
burdening a defendant’s constitutional rights.186 This calls for
identifying a purpose behind the statutory scheme, determining
whether that purpose goes beyond simply encouraging
defendants to waive their right to a jury trial, and, if there is a
legitimate purpose, concluding whether the particular
characteristics of the system are necessary to implement that
purpose.187
This Note argues that jury sentencing serves a legitimate
purpose beyond simply encouraging defendants to waive their
right to a jury trial. Jury sentencing places the decision-making
power in the hands of a non-governmental body that more
accurately represents the “conscience of the community.”188 The
jury also has a long history in the Anglo-American legal
tradition as a bulwark against oppression by the government.189
However, by making jury sentencing mandatory after a jury
trial and by not allowing the jury to use the sentencing
guidelines, the General Assembly created a system where
judge-created sentences and jury-recommended sentences
185. See supra Part I.B.
186. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 556 (finding that all retaliation cases exhibit
impermissible motivations and purposes).
187. See Becker, supra note 136, at 793 (defining a two-prong test from
Jackson).
188. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (discussing how, with regards to retribution, the jury more
accurately reflects the “composition and experiences of the community as a
whole,” and as a result is more likely to “express the conscience of the
community”).
189. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees
of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A
right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government.”).
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dramatically diverge.190 Limiting the jury’s ability to use the
guidelines and to make further recommendations to modify
sentences has no connection to jury sentencing’s legitimate
purposes, so the General Assembly’s scheme needlessly
encourages jury trial waivers.
1.

Legitimate Purposes of Jury Sentencing in Virginia

As mentioned, the focus of the two-part inquiry of jury
sentencing in Virginia will focus on the jury’s particular
inability to review the sentencing guidelines and to recommend
additional modifications to sentences. However, answering the
first part of the inquiry from Jackson—whether a statutory
scheme has any legitimate purpose other than chilling the Sixth
Amendment right of those who assert it—requires looking at the
broader purposes of jury sentencing.191
Jury sentencing in noncapital cases, though currently only
in force in six states, has a long history in the Anglo-American
legal tradition.192 Nonetheless, by the end of the twentieth
century, scholarly opposition to jury sentencing in noncapital
cases was “nearly unanimous” and it came to be seen as “an
outdated remnant of the postcolonial period.”193 A resurgence of
support for jury sentencing in noncapital cases began in the late
1990s.
In the scholarly community, academics began to
understand the possible benefits of limiting a judge’s power in
the sentencing process. Adriaan Lanni in 1999 wrote a student
Note that was potentially the first academic paper supporting
jury sentencing in noncapital cases since 1918.194 In response to

190. See supra Part I.B.2.
191. See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.
192. See Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 316 (“This history reveals that jury
sentencing—a uniquely American innovation—was a valued democratic
institution in the early republic, but was gradually abandoned in the twentieth
century as scientific approaches to punishment came into favor.”).
193. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1788 (1999).
194. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J.
951, 951 (2003) (“I want to thank Adriaan Lanni, whose Note in the Yale Law
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the shift towards giving sentencing authority to “inexperienced
legislators” and judges subject to political pressure, Lanni
argued that jury sentencing is the “most direct and least
distorting mechanism to conform criminal sanctions to
community sentiment.”195
Practitioners and academics followed her lead at the
beginning of the twenty-first century in calling for a return to
jury sentencing in noncapital cases. According to jury
sentencing’s supporters, juries are the best decision makers to
deliver a sentence because they embody the conscience of the
community and they act as bulwarks against oppressive
government power.196
A line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Apprendi v.
New Jersey197 provided jury sentencing’s supporters with
another argument in favor of jury sentencing: jury sentencing
ostensibly forecloses confusion about whether judges are able to
determine a particular sentencing factor or if that factor is a
sentence enhancer that a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt.198 In Apprendi, the Court held that “any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”199 Apprendi and the cases that
followed created uncertainty about the difference between
elements that require jury determinations and sentencing

Journal in 1999 was the first article in eighty-one years to call for a return to
jury sentencing.”).
195. Lanni, supra note 193, at 1802.
196. See Hoffman, supra note 194, at 951 (arguing that jurors are the “best
arbiters” of the “moral inquiry” of retribution); Bertrall L. Ross, Reconciling
the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth Amendment in a Real Offense
Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 725, 725 (2006)
(discussing how the jury was “once noted as the ‘bulwark’ of our liberties and
protector against oppressive government power”).
197. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
198. See Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 314 (“This Article will argue that
legislatures should clear this jurisprudential thicket and take the final logical
step suggested by the Apprendi line of decisions: reintroduction of jury
sentencing.”).
199. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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factors that judges may determine.200 Sending the entire
sentencing determination to a jury avoids this confusion
altogether.
Jury sentencing therefore does more than just encourage a
defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial. Potential
legitimate purposes include but are not limited to the jury’s
ability to conform punishments to community sentiment and to
serve as a bulwark against government oppression, as well as
avoiding confusion about whether a judge or a jury should
determine a sentencing factor.
2. Are the Particular Characteristics of Virginia’s Jury
Sentencing Scheme Necessary to Implement its Legitimate
Purposes?
The next part of the inquiry focuses on whether particular
characteristics of a statutory scheme that tends to encourage
guilty pleas and jury trial waivers are necessary to implement
its legitimate purposes.201 The particular characteristic at issue
here is the jury’s inability to review Virginia sentencing
guidelines worksheets—a capability that judges already
have.202
This Note focuses on two legitimate purposes of jury
sentencing: (1) giving more authority to the “conscience of the
community,” and (2) preventing government oppression.203
a.

The Conscience of the Community

In the criminal justice system, juries represent a cross
section of the community and in theory serve as that

200. See Hoffman, supra note 194, at 982 (“[T]here seems to be no
principled basis upon which to truly distinguish elements from sentencing
factors.”).
201. See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part I.A.1.
203. This Note will not focus on jury sentencing’s ability to solve the
“jurisprudential problems” presented by Apprendi. This Note discusses
Apprendi solely to provide background on the resurgence in support for jury
sentencing in the early twentieth century.
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community’s “conscience.”204 In the late twentieth century,
retribution gradually replaced rehabilitation as the main goal of
sentencing, and juries are hypothetically the better decision
maker to determine a sentence in line with the community’s
standards for retribution.205
One possible reason behind not allowing juries to review
guidelines worksheets may be to enable the jury to deliver a
sentence fully in line with the community’s standard for
retribution. Reviewing guidelines worksheets may only confuse
the jury and distract it from its main task, and the only person
who should interact with this more administrative aspect of the
sentencing process is the judge, a legal expert.
On the other hand, providing this tool to the jury may
support the jury’s role as the community’s representative by
giving it a clear picture of how sentencing works today. Even
some of jury sentencing’s supporters recognize the need for the
jury to have access to the guidelines.206 The guidelines provide
judges with a snapshot of how decision makers have sentenced
all other defendants guilty of similar types and numbers of
offenses as well as how the decision maker factored in such
characteristics as prior criminal history.207 The guidelines came
into being to fill the void that the abolition of parole and the
system of good credits created.208 They are discretionary; they
do not replace a decision maker’s ultimate judgment in
fashioning an appropriate sentence.209 Instead, they provide the
decision maker with an accurate depiction of Virginia’s modern

204. See Lanni, supra note 193, at 1775 (“The one task that juries
indisputably perform better than judges is to reflect the ‘conscience of the
community’ and to express public outrage at the transgression of community
norms.”).
205. See Ross, supra note 196, at 728 (discussing the shift from
rehabilitation goals of sentencing to retributive goals).
206. See Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 359 (“The key, therefore, is to devise
sentencing standards (for example, statutory ranges or sentencing guidelines)
that would enhance the coherence of jury sentencing decisions.”).
207. See supra Part I.A.
208. See supra Part I.A.
209. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (describing the judge’s
duty to review the relevant discretionary sentencing guidelines worksheets).
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system of sentencing. Accepting the usefulness of this tool, judge
concurrence rate with the guidelines has steadily increased
since 1995 to what it is today: 83.4 percent.210
By contrast, the current statutory scheme presents the jury
with a distorted picture of the sentencing process by only
providing the statutory minimum and maximum sentences for
each offense.211 The current scheme inhibits a jury’s ability to
consider whether a defendant should receive a sentence that is
similar to other defendants convicted of the same offense and
with similar criminal histories.
A few years after parole was abolished in Virginia, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that sentencing juries shall be
instructed on the abolition of parole for noncapital offenses.212
The Supreme Court of Virginia based this holding in part on its
finding that a jury should have “all significant and appropriate
information that would avoid the necessity that it speculate or
act upon misconceptions concerning the effect of its decision.”213
That same concern should apply here. A jury, in performing its
mission as the community’s conscience, should be aware of how
the sentencing process works and the judicial branch’s role—
i.e., in Virginia, the jury’s role—in that process.214 Achieving
this level of awareness requires allowing the jury to review
guidelines worksheets.
b.

Bulwark Against Government Oppression

When the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, it found that “[a] right to jury
210. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
211. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
212. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000)
(“[W]e will direct that henceforth juries shall be instructed, as a matter of law,
on the abolition of parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on or after
January 1, 1995 . . . .”).
213. Id. at 633.
214. See Hinton v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Va. 1978) (“Under
our system, the assessment of punishment is a function of the judicial branch
of government, while the administration of such punishment is a
responsibility of the executive department.”).
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trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government.”215 Drawing on the fundamental
purpose of the right to a jury trial, some academics, including
Professor Bertrall Ross, have identified jury sentencing’s
potential to prevent government oppression at the sentencing
phase.216
Blocking the jury’s access to guidelines worksheets that are
available to judges is not necessary to allow the jury to serve as
a bulwark against government oppression. On the contrary,
limiting the jury’s ability to use this tool enhances the
government’s power over a defendant by encouraging
defendants to waive their right to a jury trial. The ability to
review the sentencing guidelines would provide the jury with
more options to create a more lenient sentence.217 Virginia’s jury
sentencing scheme instead pressures defendants to turn away
from the jury and towards the government because juries are
much more likely to recommend a sentence that is more severe
than what the guidelines would recommend.218
3.

Corbitt, Jackson, and Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme

Corbitt appeared to limit the holding of Jackson to
situations where the defendant is subject to a harsher sentence
than he would be if he waived a jury trial.219 The death penalty
provision in Jackson allowed the defendant to avoid the death
penalty by waiving a jury trial.220 By contrast, in Corbitt, the

215. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
216. See Ross, supra note 196, at 728 (“It will also be argued that this role
of the jury can coexist alongside a system of real offense sentencing that both
individualizes sentencing and maintains the balance of power between the
prosecutor and the judge at sentencing.”).
217. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.B.2.
219. See supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text.
220. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968) (describing the
death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act).
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defendant could not avoid the possibility of a life sentence, the
maximum sentence, if he waived a jury trial.221
While Virginia defendants cannot avoid a statutory
maximum punishment by waiving a jury trial, the data shows
there is a much higher likelihood that they will receive a
harsher punishment from a jury as opposed to a judge.222 Judges
have increasingly relied on the guidelines to determine
punishments.223 There is a strong likelihood that juries will
deliver a sentence higher than what the sentencing guidelines
would recommend; so, by waiving a jury trial, defendants have
a significantly higher chance of receiving a lower punishment.224
For example, had Mr. Tucker pled guilty or chosen to have
a bench trial, he would have had a 79.6 percent chance of
receiving a six-year sentence in line with the sentencing
guidelines recommendation.225 Instead, he chose to assert his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and faced a 46.6 percent
chance of receiving a sentence higher than what the guidelines
recommended.226 In the end he received a much more severe
fifty-one-year sentence.227
The facts of Jackson are clear: the death penalty provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Act created two different statutory
maximum punishments for those who asserted their right to a
jury trial and those who waived that right.228 However, the
Court’s holding in that case was not limited to this particular
type of situation where the statutory scheme creates two
distinct levels of punishment; rather, the Court tied its finding
of an impermissible burden to its inability to find the provision

221. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 214–16 (1978) (describing
the New Jersey homicide statutes).
222. See supra Part I.B.2.
223. See supra Part I.B.2.
224. See supra Part I.B.2.
225. See supra Table 1.
226. See supra Table 1.
227. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
228. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571 (describing the death penalty provision
of the Federal Kidnaping Act).
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necessary to carry out a legitimate purpose.229 A rigid factual
rule like the one suggested in Corbitt encourages legislatures to
devise more clever statutory schemes that, while they may not
in fact create two different maximum sentences, they do so in
effect.230
That is the situation in Virginia under mandatory jury
sentencing. Defendants, aware of the strong likelihood that a
jury would give them a harsher sentence than a judge would,
waive their right to a jury trial to avoid that harsher sentence.231
This is the reality absent any preliminary negotiations with the
government to waive a jury trial or plead guilty.
III. NEXT STEPS
The jury sentencing scheme established by the Virginia
General Assembly in 1994 imposes an impermissible burden on
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—a
constitutional issue that defendants could attempt to address by
challenging the validity of the system in court as the defendant
successfully did in Jackson.232 By declaring the statutes that
deny the jury the abilities to review the guidelines and to
consider other ways to modify a sentence as unconstitutional, a
court would permanently block the General Assembly from
maintaining these aspects of jury sentencing.
Virginia’s General Assembly is now attempting to fix the
problem by passing legislation to amend the relevant sentencing
statutes.233 While this is a positive step, the General Assembly
229. See id. at 582 (finding that the legitimate goal of limiting the
imposition of the death penalty “can be achieved without penalizing those
defendants who plead not guilty and demand jury trial”).
230. See Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 217 (noting that the statutory scheme in
Jackson included the death penalty and a more lenient maximum sentence if
the defendant pled guilty).
231. See supra Part I.B.2.
232. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968) (describing the
district court’s dismissal of count one of the indictment based on its finding
that the Federal Kidnapping Act was unconstitutional because it “makes the
‘risk of death’ the price for asserting the right to jury trial, and thereby
‘impairs . . . free exercise’ of that constitutional right”).
233. See infra Part III.D.
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and Governor during one session may choose to reform the
sentencing scheme, but the General Assembly and Governor
during another session could choose to reinstate the previous,
unconstitutional scheme in response to, for example, a
significant increase in the number of jury trials after reform, or
in response to jurors struggling to properly use the guidelines.234
This Part discusses how making jury sentencing optional
for defendants would adequately safeguard a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right.235 This Part also explains what reforms—in
the absence of optional jury sentencing—are necessary to give
juries access to the guidelines and what procedures are
necessary to facilitate effective use of the guidelines.236 Finally,
this Part considers how reform would impact Virginia criminal
sentencing and the future possibility that the General Assembly
could pass legislation to return to a constitutionally problematic
jury sentencing scheme.237
A.

Optional Jury Sentencing and Virginia Senate Bills 811
and 5007

Even if jurors could review sentencing guidelines
worksheets, jurors would not face the same pressure from the
General Assembly that judges—who are elected by the General
Assembly238—feel to comply with the guidelines.239 Allowing a
defendant to opt for a judge-created sentence would remove the
danger of an extreme jury sentence and also avoid any problems
that could stem from less pressure on juries to follow the
guidelines.

234. See infra Parts III.B, IV.D.
235. See infra Part III.A.
236. See infra Part III.B–C.
237. See infra Part III.D.
238. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (“The judges of all other courts of record
shall be chosen by the vote of the majority of the members elected to each
house of the General Assembly for terms of eight years.”).
239. King & Noble, supra note 39, at 916. (“Judges and lawyers alike
explained that guidelines adherence was linked to the judicial apprehension
that upward departures would be considered negatively by the legislature at
reelection.”).
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Virginia and Kentucky stand alone as the only states that
make jury sentencing mandatory after the guilt phase of a
noncapital jury trial.240 The other four states that allow jury
sentencing provide varying options to the defendant.241 For
example, in Arkansas the defendant may waive jury sentencing
but must first obtain consent from the court and prosecution.242
In Texas, the judge will impose the sentence unless the
defendant requests a jury sentence.243 While a system like that
of Texas is more favorable to the defendant, either way, the
possibility that a judge may first determine a sentence lifts
pressure off of the defendant when he is deciding whether or not
to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
On February 5, 2020, Democrats on the Virginia Senate
Judiciary Committee introduced Virginia Senate Bill 811 to
allow juries to give both a verdict on guilt and a sentence at the
same time with no additional sentencing hearing.244 However,
senators dramatically altered the bill to instead end mandatory
jury sentencing by making judge sentencing the default after
jury trials, while preserving a defendant’s ability to choose to
have a jury sentence.245 The House of Delegates later pushed the
bill to 2021 for reconsideration, but Senate Democrats revived
the effort to end mandatory jury sentencing in August 2020

240. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
242. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2020) (“After a jury finds guilt, the
defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court,
may waive jury sentencing, in which case the court shall impose
sentence . . . .”).
243. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) (West 2019)
(explaining that the judge shall assess the punishment unless the defendant
requests a jury sentence).
244. See S.B. 811, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (substituting
the original bill that was titled “Sentencing in a criminal case; bifurcated jury
trial”).
245. See id. (“If the jury finds the defendant guilty of an offense for which
the death penalty may not be imposed and the accused has requested that the
jury ascertain punishment of the offense . . . it shall fix the punishment as
provided in § 19.2-295.1.”).
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during a Special Session.246 After two months of back and forth
between the Senate and House and a series of amendments,
Virginia Senate Bill 5007, which would make jury sentencing
optional, passed on October 16, 2020 with the caveat that the
bill would not be enacted until July 2021.247
Granting defendants the power to decide who will
determine their sentence would give them the ability to choose
between a decision maker who has complete access to resources
like the sentencing guidelines and leniency modification tools (a
judge) or one that does not (a jury). By choosing a judge, a
defendant could avoid the risk discussed in this Note that a jury
might recommend a harsher sentence than a judge.248 This
legislative solution alone could adequately address that
constitutional issue.
B.

Jury Access to the Sentencing Guidelines and Virginia
Senate Bill 810

Without optional jury sentencing, the next best reform is
providing
the
jury
with
sentencing
guidelines
recommendations. One line in Virginia’s code blocks the jury’s
access to the sentencing guidelines: “In cases tried by a jury, the
jury shall not be presented any information regarding
sentencing guidelines.”249 To address the constitutional issue
that results from not allowing the jury to review the guidelines,
the General Assembly could begin by simply deleting “not” from
that sentence and giving the jury the ability to review completed
sentencing guidelines worksheets.
At the beginning of 2020 some Virginia senators attempted
to do just that. On January 8, 2020, Senator Joseph Morrissey

246. See S.B. 5007, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020) (allowing
the defendant to choose whether to have a jury sentence him or her).
247. See Ned Oliver, Virginia Lawmakers Vote to Reform 224-Year-Old
Jury Sentencing Law, VA. MERCURY (Oct. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/6MJ2AJQ3 (describing Virginia Senate Bill 5007’s history and the debate
surrounding it).
248. See supra Part I.B.
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2020).
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introduced Virginia Senate Bill 810,250 titled, “Discretionary
sentencing guidelines worksheets; use by juries,” which seeks to
add language to Virginia Code Section 19.2-295.1251 including
that “the jury shall be presented with discretionary sentencing
guidelines worksheets” and that “the court shall instruct the
jury that the applicable discretionary sentencing guidelines
worksheets are discretionary and not binding.”252 The bill also
intends to modify the language of Virginia Code Section
19.2-298.01,253 which prevents any party from presenting
information regarding the guidelines worksheets to the jury, to
instead allow juries to receive the applicable worksheets.254
The proposed bill is not clear as to whether the jury would
receive blank sentencing guidelines worksheets that the jury
must complete or if the jury would receive completed sentencing
guidelines worksheets that probationary officers currently
complete.255 Requiring jurors to complete worksheets
themselves would be problematic. The VCSC offers a variety of
training programs to teach practitioners how to accurately score
guidelines factors in the worksheets,256 which means that it
would be impossible to effectively train juries in a more limited
sentencing phase timeframe. Virginia Senate Bill 810 should
clarify this point to avoid court confusion by definitively stating
that probation officers will continue to complete the worksheets
and then submit them to the jurors for review.

250. S.B. 810, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
251. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1.
252. Va. S.B. 810, at 1.
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01.
254. Va. S.B. 810, at 1.
255. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(C) (2020) (“In felony cases, other
than Class 1 felonies, tried by a jury and in felony cases tried by the court
without a jury upon a plea of not guilty, the court shall direct a probation
officer of such court to prepare the discretionary sentencing guidelines
worksheets.”).
256. See Training, VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, https://perma.cc/77TG-4VTQ
(providing a variety of training programs for attorneys and criminal justice
professionals, including a $125 “Introduction to Sentencing Guidelines” course
that teaches practitioners how to accurately score guidelines worksheets).
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Jury Ability to Recommend Sentences Below the Statutory
Minimum Level and Virginia Senate Bill 326

Allowing juries to review completed sentencing guidelines
worksheets would not benefit criminal defendants if juries
cannot also recommend sentences below the statutory minimum
sentence. Juries must also have the power to recommend that
the judge suspend a sentence in full or in part and that the judge
order that the defendant serve sentences for multiple offenses
concurrently.
Before Virginia abolished parole, offenders often served
much less time than what the statutory minimum prescribed for
a particular offense, so the guidelines—keyed to pre-parole
abolition punishment levels—may therefore recommend a
punishment range below the statutory minimum punishment
for a particular offense.257 To remain in compliance with the
guidelines, judges must frequently suspend a sentence or order
that a defendant serve multiple offenses concurrently.258 For
example, if a drug offense statutory minimum punishment is
five years but the guidelines recommend one year of
punishment, the judge must impose the five-year sentence but
would need to suspend four years to comply with the guidelines
recommendation. In this example, the shortest sentence the
jury could recommend is the five-year statutory minimum. A
judge can bring the jury recommended sentence into compliance
with the guidelines by suspending the sentence him or
herself;259 however, the reality is that judges are hesitant to
modify jury sentences.260 Permitting juries to review guidelines
worksheets must therefore coincide with allowing juries to
recommend that the judge suspend a sentence in whole or in
part and that the judge order that the defendant serve sentences
for multiple offenses concurrently.
Virginia Senator Creigh Deeds introduced a bill in January
2020 that would give a jury those abilities. Virginia Senate Bill
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.3.
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326,261 titled “Sentencing proceeding by the jury after
conviction; recommendation of leniency,” seeks to amend
Section 19.2-295.1 of the Virginia Code262 by adding language
that includes, “In ascertaining punishment, the jury may
recommend that the sentence imposed be suspended in whole or
in part, or that sentences imposed for multiple offenses be
served concurrently, except where such suspension of sentence
or concurrent service is prohibited by law.”263 If passed, this bill
alone would increase the probability that juries would
recommend sentences that comply with guidelines
recommendations because it allows them to recommend
sentences below the statutory minimum sentence.
However, without the guidelines, juries would still have no
way of knowing the extent to which (1) defendants sometimes
receive punishments at or near the statutory minimum level,
and (2) a judge would modify punishments through suspension
or by ordering a defendant to serve sentences for multiple
offenses concurrently. For example, a jury convicted Norell
Sterling Ward of two counts of possessing heroin with intent to
distribute and one count of conspiracy to distribute.264 The
Virginia Criminal Code provides that each of those offenses
requires a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum
sentence of forty years.265 After factoring in Ward’s criminal
history and other extraneous factors, the guidelines
recommended range of punishment for all three counts was six
years and four months to ten years and five months, with a

261. S.B. 326, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
262. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (2020).
263. Va. S.B. 326, at 1.
264. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
265. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(C) (“[A]ny person who violates this
section with respect to a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II
shall upon conviction be imprisoned for not less than five nor more than 40
years and fined not more than $500,000.”); Id. § 18.2-256 (providing that the
punishment for a person found guilty of conspiring to commit any offense
included in the article “may not be less than the minimum punishment nor
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission
of which was the object of the conspiracy”).
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midpoint of eight years and six months.266 That means the
sentencing guidelines recommended a midpoint punishment of
a little under three years for each offense, which is two years
below the statutory five-year minimum level.267 If the judge in
Ward’s case had sentenced Ward and complied with the
guidelines—and, in 2017, judges complied 81.6 percent of the
time268—he would have had at least two options if he imposed
the statutory minimum level of five years for each offense. First,
the judge could have ordered Ward to serve three five-year
minimum sentences consecutively—a total of fifteen years—and
suspend at least four years and seven months of the sentence to
reach the high-end recommendation of ten years and five
months.269 Second, he could have ordered Ward to serve two of
the five-year sentences concurrently alongside the third
sentence for a total punishment of ten years.270
Instead, without the guidelines and with no ability to
recommend suspending the sentence or ordering that the
sentences be served concurrently, the jury recommended a
sixty-five-year sentence.271 The jury went well beyond
recommending the statutory minimum five-year punishment for
each offense: at sixty-five years total, the jury recommended a
little under twenty-two years for each offense.272 To reach the
guidelines recommended range with its sixty-five-year
recommended punishment, the jury would have needed to
recommend that the judge suspend at least fifty-four years and
266. VCSC WARD SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 9. To
comply with the guidelines, a decision maker does not need to impose the
midpoint; rather, the decision maker must impose a sentence within the
recommended range, which can be slightly below or above the midpoint. See
2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 12 (defining concurrence with
guidelines).
267. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
268. 2017 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 27,
https://perma.cc/N897-3YVW (PDF).
269. See VCSC WARD SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 9
(recommending a high-end punishment of ten years and five months).
270. See id. (recommending a high-end punishment of ten years and five
months).
271. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
272. Id. Sixty-five divided by three is 21.67.
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seven months to reach the high-end recommendation of ten
years and five months.273 Alternatively, if the jury had
recommended that Ward serve all three sentences concurrently,
the total recommended sentence would have been around
twenty-two years.274 Still, the jury would have needed to
recommend that the judge suspend at least eleven years and
seven months of the sentence.275
In sum, the jury still has a number of hoops to jump through
to reach guidelines recommended ranges with no ability to
review guidelines worksheets. Juries would likely fail to (1)
recommend a sentence at or near statutory minimum levels, or
(2) recommend sufficient modifications to the sentence. As a
result, recurrent jury sentence divergence from guidelines
recommendations would persist.276 While jury concurrence with
guidelines may rise slightly in the interim, this statistic would
continue to pale in comparison to judge concurrence rates, which
have steadily risen over the past twenty-five years to 83.9
percent in 2019.277
Accordingly, the proposed changes in both Virginia Senate
Bill 810 and Virginia Senate Bill 326 must both be in effect to
address the constitutional problems that stem from Virginia’s
mandatory jury sentencing scheme.278 Without the ability to
recommend sentence suspensions or concurrent sentences, a
jury would be unable to recommend a sentencing guidelines
recommendation that falls below the statutory minimum
punishment level. Without the sentencing guidelines, a jury
would have no way of understanding the extent to which judges
have modified sentences to levels well below what a statute may
command.
Naturally, passing legislation like Virginia Senate Bills 326
and 810 in addition to Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007 would
be the best-case scenario: together, the bills would place the
273. See VCSC WARD SENTENCING SUMMARY, supra note 9 (recommending
a high-end punishment of ten years and five months).
274. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
275. See VCSC WARD SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 9
(providing the high-end recommendation for Ward).
276. See supra Part I.B.2.
277. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
278. See supra Part II.
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judge and jury on roughly equal footing while still reserving the
ultimate choice of who will determine the sentence for the
defendant. Nevertheless, each would represent a significant
step towards lifting the burden on a Virginia defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right.
D.

Jury Sentencing After Legislative Reform

Virginia Senate Democrats acted rapidly at the beginning
of the 2020 Regular Session by passing a “cascade” of bills.279
Among those bills were Virginia Senate Bills 326, 810, and 811,
all of which the Virginia Senate narrowly passed on February
11, 2020—only one or two Republicans joined the Senate
Democrats to pass each of the bills, demonstrating the
contentiousness of the issue of jury sentencing but also the
potential for bipartisan cooperation.280 While the Senate passed
these three bills, the House of Delegates Courts of Justice
Committee decided to push consideration of the bills until
2021—sending them to the Virginia Crime Commission for
further study.281 Nevertheless, Senate Democrats successfully
279. See Gregory S. Schneider et al., Virginia Democrats Push Liberal
Agenda—with a Dose of Caution, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc
/6J7M-6QAC (describing the “hundreds of bills” Senate Democrats passed in
the early 2020 Regular Session).
280. See SB 326 Sentencing Proceeding by the Jury After Conviction;
Recommendation of Leniency, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/4C85YAZP [hereinafter SB 326 VLIS] (providing that the bill passed in the Virginia
Senate on February 11, 2020 with twenty-two votes in favor of the bill and
eighteen votes against the bill); SB 810 Discretionary Sentencing Guidelines
Worksheets; Use by Juries, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/4NXTEPF2 [hereinafter SB 810 VLIS] (providing that the bill passed in the Virginia
Senate on February 11, 2020 with twenty-two votes in favor of the bill and
eighteen votes against the bill); SB 811 Sentencing in a Criminal Case;
Bifurcated Jury Trial, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/2X2C-CNJ2
[hereinafter SB 811 VLIS] (providing that the amended bill passed in the
Virginia Senate on February 11, 2020 with twenty-three votes in favor of the
bill and seventeen votes against the bill).
281. See SB 326 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing that the House Courts of
Justice Committee decided to continue the bill to 2021 by voice vote on
February 24, 2020); SB 810 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing that the House
Courts of Justice Committee decided to continue the bill to 2021 by voice vote
on March 2, 2020); SB 811 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing that the House
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made a second push to end mandatory jury sentencing during a
2020 Special Session, assuring that mandatory jury sentencing
will end in Virginia in July 2021.282
During the Regular Session, the Courts of Justice
Committee likely pushed the three bills back to 2021 in response
to concerns with the speed at which the Senate moved to make
major changes to jury sentencing. During a Senate Judiciary
Committee meeting on February 5, 2020, Stafford County
Commonwealth’s Attorney Eric Olsen spoke in opposition to
Virginia Senate Bill 811, which sought to end mandatory jury
sentencing.283 Mr. Olsen, also speaking on behalf of the Virginia
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys, called the amended
bill an “extreme step” without an additional study.284 He went
on to state that “in a community, with your fellow citizens, you
are entitled to have your fellow citizens decide your fate on
issues of criminal justice,” and he argued that this bill, if passed,
would demonstrate a lack of “trust” in juries.285 During the
Senate’s Regular Session on February 11, Senator Mark
Obenshain of Rockingham County also spoke in opposition to
Virginia Senate Bill 811.286 Senator Obenshain argued that the
bill was a “significant change of policy and it is not something
we should do without giving it some thought” and that, if
passed, the bill was something “we will regret doing with this

Courts of Justice Committee decided to continue the bill to 2021 by voice vote
on March 2, 2020).
282. See SB 5007 Criminal Cases; Sentencing Reform, Procedure for Trial
by Jury, Etc., VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/Y5BH-255G [hereinafter
SB 5007 VLIS] (providing that after nearly two months of debate, both the
House of Delegates and Senate agreed to end mandatory jury sentencing after
adding an enactment date of July 1, 2021).
283. Feb. 5, 2020 Hearing on S.B. 811 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) at 1:23:25, https://
perma.cc/FL5E-3S67 (discussing the amended bill and allowing community
members to voice support or opposition for the bill).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See Feb. 11, 2020 Regular Session, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2020) at Part 1 2:33:27, https://perma.cc/FL5E-3S67 (showing the full Senate
debate on Senate Bill 811 and other bills).
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speed and dispatch.”287 The Senate then passed Virginia Senate
Bill 811 with twenty-three votes in favor of the bill and
seventeen votes against.288
Despite the House’s decision to push Virginia Senate Bills
326, 810, and 811 to 2021, Senate Democrats successfully
passed Virginia Senate Bill 5007 during a 2020 Special Session,
assuring that mandatory jury sentencing will end in Virginia in
July 2021.289 Ending mandatory jury sentencing represents a
landmark departure from Virginia’s longtime support of the
controversial practice,290 and the reform could have a sizeable
impact on Virginia’s criminal justice system.
Theoretically, consistent with comments made by those who
opposed Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007, requests for jury
trials could rise dramatically if jury sentencing became optional,
overwhelming court caseloads. Compared with Texas, a state
with optional jury sentencing similar to the proposed system in
Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007, the percentage of
convictions adjudicated by bench trials in Virginia was over
twice as large as that of Texas.291 A large percentage of
defendants in Virginia that would have previously requested a
bench trial could instead request a jury trial. As a result, the
percentage of convictions adjudicated by jury trials could
increase significantly. However, as the sponsors and supporters
of Senate Bill 5007 explained during the Special Session, the
reality is that it is unlikely that jury trials will rise dramatically
given how infrequent they are in other optional jury sentencing
states.292 The more likely scenario will be a moderate initial

287. Id.
288. See SB 811 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing the history of Virginia
Senate Bill 811).
289. See Oliver, supra note 247 (explaining the history of Virginia Senate
Bill 5007).
290. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
292. Sept. 25, 2020 Hearing on S.B. 5007 Before the House of Delegates
Comm. on Appropriations, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020) at
10:40:47, https://perma.cc/5R32-5Z8U (discussing the potential financial
impact of Virginia Senate Bill 5007).
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uptick in the number of jury trials, followed by a downward
trend to levels similar to other optional jury sentencing states.293
Another potential situation that could prompt reinstating
mandatory jury sentencing could be a change in political control
of the General Assembly. However, which political party has
control may have little to do with the matter. When Virginia
first passed truth-in-sentencing reforms in 1994—including
abolishing parole and denying the jury the ability to review the
sentencing guidelines—Democrats held majorities in both the
House of Delegates and the Senate.294
Without the reforms contained in Virginia Senate Bills 326,
810, 811, and 5007, the constitutional issue discussed in this
Note would persist in Virginia, and defendants would be stuck
between choosing to have a jury trial or waiving their Sixth
Amendment right to ensure a judge determines their
sentences.295 The best way to reform Virginia jury sentencing is
to make jury sentencing optional for defendants, the solution
proposed by Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007.296 But if
mandatory jury sentencing returns, passing both Virginia
Senate Bills 326 and 810—allowing juries to review completed
guidelines worksheets and giving juries the ability to
recommend that a judge suspend a sentence or order a
defendant to serve multiple sentences concurrently—would also
resolve the constitutional issue, provided that the General
Assembly make the suggested edit to Virginia Senate Bill 810
that the jury receive completed guidelines worksheets.297
Passing and preserving these reforms is essential to resolve the
constitutional issue discussed in this Note, and critical for
criminal defendants in Virginia.

293. Id.
294. See Party Control of Virginia State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
perma.cc/7MES-EBLT (illustrating that in 1994, Democrats controlled the
General Assembly, while the Governor was a Republican).
295. See supra Part II.
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See supra Part III.B–C.
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CONCLUSION

Virginia legislators are now attuned to the potential
problems created by jury sentencing schemes and in particular
the detrimental impact that mandatory jury sentencing has had
on Virginia criminal defendants for decades. As a result of
successful reform efforts, Virginia will become one of five states
with an optional jury sentencing scheme.298
This Note focused on Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme, but
the issues discussed are relevant for all states that allow or that
could choose to allow the jury to first recommend a sentence for
the defendant. Any proponent of jury sentencing—academic or
political—must reckon with the possibility that political actors
could exploit the system to threaten a defendant’s right to a jury
trial.
Legislative reform or abolition of jury sentencing schemes
may shield a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, but the fact
remains that future legislative action could reverse that
reform.299 Advocates must therefore continue to monitor jury
sentencing statutory schemes and the legislative bodies that
create them, holding them accountable by referencing the
harmful effect that jury sentencing can have on a defendant’s
ability to exercise his or her fundamental Sixth Amendment
right.300

298. See supra Part III.
299. See supra Part III.D.
300. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (“Our
conclusion is that in the American States, as in the federal judicial system, a
general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential
for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are
provided for all defendants.”).
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Appendix 1
Table 1: Jury Sentencing Guidelines Compliance
JURY Year
1995

Complia
nce (%)
49.2

Aggravat
ion (%)
37.7

Mitigati
on (%)
13.1

1996

47.5

41.99

10.6

1997

42.8

45.7

11.5

1998

43.3

44.3

12.4

1999

40.9

45.8

13.3

Cite
1995 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 56,
https://perma.cc/G
F6A-A4DA (PDF).
1996 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 34,
https://perma.cc/7
DX3-7WFH (PDF).
1997 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 40,
https://perma.cc/X
FP6-LWC3 (PDF).
1998 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 46,
https://perma.cc/6
T93-WCBN (PDF).
1999 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 54,
https://perma.cc/5
BWQ-DYBC
(PDF).
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2000

37.1

55.8

7.1

2001

30.4

56.2

13.4

2002

42.3

47

10.7

2003

37

42

21

2004

34

44

22

2005

49

38

13

2000 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 42,
https://perma.cc/5
N8C-3GN5 (PDF).
2001 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 30,
https://perma.cc/3
WRN-VYET
(PDF).
2002 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 38,
https://perma.cc/2
A6U-2VS3 (PDF).
2003 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 34,
https://perma.cc/M
2SS-NBGR (PDF).
2004 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/Q
4DC-ZPXM (PDF).
2005 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 28,
https://perma.cc/M
695-72AN (PDF).
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2006

50

39

11

2007

43

48

9

2008

42

44

14

2009

40

52

8

2010

41

52

7

2011

39

51

10

2006 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 30,
https://perma.cc/P
P6H-9XVS (PDF).
2007 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 38,
https://perma.cc/8
KTT-8BYL (PDF).
2008 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 32,
https://perma.cc/3
NVB-BMY7
(PDF).
2009 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/Q
7C3-EBA6 (PDF).
2010 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 37,
https://perma.cc/9
SF6-P4V7 (PDF).
2011 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/3
QDE-VFPP (PDF).
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2012

45

50

5

2013

42

49

9

2014

32.3

53.3

14.4

2015

43.3

47.4

9.3

2016

42.9

48

9.2

2017

43

46

11

2012 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 24,
https://perma.cc/7
VW4-F94K (PDF).
2013 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 32,
https://perma.cc/H
ER4-DVYZ (PDF).
2014 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/W
94M-PQFCf
(PDF).
2015 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 37,
https://perma.cc/7
MVK-GB9B
(PDF).
2016 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 28,
https://perma.cc/79
Q9-E3ME (PDF).
2017 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/N
897-3YVW (PDF).
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2018

39.4

49.8

10.8

2019

49.7

36.7

13.6

AVERA
GES

41.84
4

46.587
6

2018 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/M
M3U-CPU7 (PDF).
2019 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 29,
https://perma.cc/D
3NT-GA6D (PDF).

11.57
6

Table 2: Judge Sentencing Guidelines Compliance
JUDGE
Year
1995

Complia
nce (%)
75

Aggravat
ion (%)
14.5

Mitigati
on (%)
10.5

1996

75.8

13.1

11.1

1997

76.2

12.5

11.3

1998

75.4

11.8

12.8

Cite
1995 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 41,
https://perma.cc/G
F6A-A4DA (PDF).
1996 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 34,
https://perma.cc/7
DX3-7WFH (PDF).
1997 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 40,
https://perma.cc/X
FP6-LWC3 (PDF).
1998 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G

578

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519 (2021)

1999

78.1

10.5

11.4

2000

80.3

9.1

10.6

2001

80.8

8.6

10.6

2002

78.2

9.3

12.5

2003

80

10

10

2004

81

9

10

COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 46,
https://perma.cc/6
T93-WCBN (PDF).
1999 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 54,
https://perma.cc/5
BWQ-DYBC
(PDF).
2000 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 42,
https://perma.cc/5
N8C-3GN5 (PDF).
2001 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 30,
https://perma.cc/3
WRN-VYET
(PDF).
2002 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 38,
https://perma.cc/2
A6U-2VS3 (PDF).
2003 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 34,
https://perma.cc/M
2SS-NBGR (PDF).
2004 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
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2005

82

9

9

2006

82

9

9

2007

80

10

10

2008

80

10

10

2009

80

10

10

2010

80

9

11

COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/Q
4DC-ZPXM (PDF).
2005 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 28,
https://perma.cc/M
695-72AN (PDF).
2006 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 30,
https://perma.cc/P
P6H-9XVS (PDF).
2007 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 38,
https://perma.cc/8
KTT-8BYL (PDF).
2008 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 32,
https://perma.cc/3
NVB-BMY7
(PDF).
2009 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/Q
7C3-EBA6 (PDF).
2010 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
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2011

80

9

11

2012

79

10

11

2013

79

10

11

2014

78.9

10

11.1

2015

80.6

8.9

10.5

2016

81.1

9.1

9.8

REP. 37,
https://perma.cc/9
SF6-P4V7 (PDF).
2011 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/3
QDE-VFPP (PDF).
2012 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 24,
https://perma.cc/7
VW4-F94K (PDF).
2013 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 32,
https://perma.cc/H
ER4-DVYZ (PDF).
2014 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/W
94M-PQFCf
(PDF).
2015 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 37,
https://perma.cc/7
MVK-GB9B
(PDF).
2016 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
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2017

81.6

8.8

9.6

2018

82.3

8.7

8.9

2019

83.9

7.4

8.6

79.64

9.892

AVERA
GES

8

10.45
2

REP. 28,
https://perma.cc/79
Q9-E3ME (PDF).
2017 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/N
897-3YVW (PDF).
2018 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/M
M3U-CPU7 (PDF).
2019 VA. CRIM.
SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 29,
https://perma.cc/D
3NT-GA6D (PDF).
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Table 3: Judge Modification of Jury Sentence Rate

Year

2004

Judge
Modification
Rate (%)
16

2005

24

2006

20

2007

22

2008

17

2009

24

2010

25

2011

19

Cite

2004 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/Q4DC-ZPXM
(PDF).
2005 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 28,
https://perma.cc/M695-72AN
(PDF).
2006 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 30,
https://perma.cc/PP6H-9XVS
(PDF).
2007 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 38,
https://perma.cc/8KTT-8BYL
(PDF).
2008 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 32,
https://perma.cc/3NVB-BMY7
(PDF).
2009 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/Q7C3-EBA6
(PDF).
2010 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 37,
https://perma.cc/9SF6-P4V7
(PDF).
2011 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/3QDE-VFPP
(PDF).
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2012

22

2013

17

2014

20

2015
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2018
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9

AVERAGE

18.9375

2012 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 24,
https://perma.cc/7VW4-F94K
(PDF).
2013 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 32,
https://perma.cc/HER4-DVYZ
(PDF).
2014 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 35,
https://perma.cc/W94M-PQFCf
(PDF).
2015 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 37,
https://perma.cc/7MVK-GB9B
(PDF).
2016 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 28,
https://perma.cc/79Q9-E3ME
(PDF).
2017 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/N897-3YVW
(PDF).
2018 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 27,
https://perma.cc/MM3U-CPU7
(PDF).
2019 VA. CRIM. SENT’G
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 29,
https://perma.cc/D3NT-GA6D
(PDF).
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Table 4: Correlation Between Jury Aggravation Rate and
Judge Modification Rate
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Correlation
Correlation
without
2019

301.
302.

See Appendix Table 1.
See Appendix Table 3.

JURY Agg
Rate (%)301
44
38
39
48
44
52
52
51
50
49
53.3
47.4
48
46
49.8
36.7
0.38961429
0.10012348

JUDGE
Mod Rate
(%)302
16
24
20
22
17
24
25
19
22
17
20
22
16
14
16
9

